The news is that the government has given the go-ahead for construction work on Highspeed 2 to start, even though much of the country is still in lockdown. There are a lot of people quite vociferous that this is not a good time to start, and some arguing that this is a good time to drop the whole HS2 project.
Well there is an argument for HS2 that it will free up more space for rail freight, which is a good thing. And I'm more of a fan of HS3 (which if it ever happens, will be at such a future date that it will do me personally no good). But those are discussions for another day.
What I wanted to do is discuss is why one factor in this decision is rather unexpected, and an example of the interconnectedness and complexity of our economy. Yes, starting work keeps some people in jobs and keeps some money flowing in the economy and it is probably better to get some building done for that money rather than pay people 80% to be furloughed. And yes, it is a big project so might as well get started. And yes, having started people will be reluctant to stop because of the sunk cost fallacy. But I'm not thinking of any of those.
Not starting HS2 now might have an impact on the NHS and our fight against Covid-19. How so?
Well, when we start the construction work we will need concrete - which means that the cement kilns need to be kept going when otherwise they might shut down because of low demand. And if you know about cement kilns, they are not as quick and easy to shut down and start up as a gas fire. But we need to look further down the supply chain. Cement kilns use a lot of fuel. Where do they get it from? They use a variety of sources, but one of them is re-processed chemicals that where originally used in the pharmaceutical industry as solvents. These can be reprocessed to some extent but they can also be blended up as fuel for cement kilns. What do we do with them if they aren't sent there? There are only 3 choices - storage, incineration, and shutting the pharmaceutical production. Storage capacity is not huge, there isn't enough incineration capacity, and it has to go somewhere if you produce it. So, you say - build more storage. Why? We don't need it when the virus is over. Burn it - well we'd love to have more incinerators, because we are already at maximum capacity, but do you want one in your backyard? And building incinerators is quick and easy compared to the process for getting permits. So, if there is nowhere to dispose of the waste (short term), the option left is to close pharmaceutical production - which is obviously not ideal during a pandemic.
So, starting work on HS2 keeps the kilns fired up using fuel from the pharmaceutical industries, which helps the NHS. A complex web... isn't it?
Showing posts with label Pharmaceuticals. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pharmaceuticals. Show all posts
Thursday, 16 April 2020
Tuesday, 19 April 2011
OECD: Innovation and Trade in Pharmaceuticals
The OECD has just published a document on the links between Trade and Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry. I was an (unnamed) contributor to the study, which I think is quite interesting. The study was not able to take account of the developments in the industry in the past quarter (the closing of a number of UK based R&D facilities), but highlights the UKs strong position in pharmaceuticals, and the dominance of the developed world. Although India is growing strongly, this is still an industry based in, and for, the "west".
Over time this will surely change, but for the moment the question for Western economies must be how do we build on and maintain this advantage?
The paper can be found here.
A previous study I was involved with looked at Chemicals. It is possible that a revised document will bring together both of these studies later in the year.
Over time this will surely change, but for the moment the question for Western economies must be how do we build on and maintain this advantage?
The paper can be found here.
A previous study I was involved with looked at Chemicals. It is possible that a revised document will bring together both of these studies later in the year.
Friday, 19 June 2009
Follow up: NICE and the Price of Life
A quick follow up to the last post - a documentary by Adam Wishart covering the same ground as his article on NICE is available on the BBC I-player until 25th June 2009.
Details here.
It is called "the Price of Life".
Details here.
It is called "the Price of Life".
Friday, 12 June 2009
In place of Negotiation - NICE and the cost of drugs
In the Sunday Times on 7th June 2009 Adam Wishart had an interesting article on the procurement of drugs by the NHS, and the role of NICE. The article is "the unbearable cost of living". I apologise if my summary of the article in any way misrepresents it, and I suggest people read it themselves.
Adam Wishart has himself lost a parent to cancer, and so at the start of the article is very much on the side of the patients who are asking why they are being denied new treatments which they think might help them, which have been rejected by the National Council for Clinical Excellence on the grounds that they cannot be justified in terms of value for money. Naturally the patients believe that the lives of their loved ones (usually their loved ones, not themselves) is worth any amount of money.
This is a very emotive, and emotional, issue and some people will think that the NHS should be about saving lives and not about the cost of treatment. Adam Wishart explores this and quite unusually moves beyond his initial position to recognising that finances are limited, and if we spend too much on any one treatment we reduce the amount available for other treatments. He asks the very difficult question, that has to be tackled by the NHS and by NICE, "should we give preference to terminally ill patients by giving them access to expensive new treatments that could extend their life, or should we spend the money on less ill patients who will benefit from their treatment for years to come". The wisdom of Solomon indeed is needed for such questions.
He raises the question of why the drug companies charge so much for their new products, and quite reasonably explains that they are out to make a profit, and the way to do that is to charge a high price. And if people will pay $100 000 for another year of life (and wouldn't we all if we had the money) then it is in their interests to charge that - even if it means some people cannot afford it.
The point I wanted to get to though is his final point - "why can't NICE negotiate lower prices?". The NICE process is to approve drugs for clinical use on the basis of value for money - and it is a pass/fail system. If you cannot demonstrate that the efficacy of your new drug justifies its cost, then it is not approved and will not be provided on the NHS.
There are several drug treatments that are quite beneficial, and quite expensive, and fail the NICE test because of their cost - surely if we negotiated with the manufacturers to lower their prices we could provide them on the NHS?
This seems sensible at first glance, certainly to people not used to the commercial environment. What is not apparent is that this will lead to higher prices overall.
What NICE are doing is asking for, effectively, a fixed price proposal. They want the bidding companies to put in their very best price - the one that will give them the best chance of winning business. Removing the oppportunity to negotiate puts the pressure on the drug companies to put in a low price to improve their chance of winning the contract - in effect they are going to always put in a price on the low side of the range of possible pricing points.
If we introduce post bid negotiation we have a number of consequences.
The first is the that the drug company no longer has so much fear of not being succesful, and so is more likely to put in a price in the middle or top of their possible pricing band - if this price is too high they can always reduce it in negotiation to win the business. The fear of not getting the business is a key factor in salesmen setting lower prices - remove it and they will go for higher margins.
So, the average input prices will go up - and the average price paid will go up as a consequence. We will approve anything below our value for money point, though those prices may be higher than under the no-negotiation system, and will negotiate on those that are too expensive. On average this means prices paid increase - not the first time, and not on everthing, but over time and on average they will rise. Note that the performance of the drug has not improved - but the price we pay will rise, meaning the NHS becomes less cost effective.
Note that we have also created more work for ourselves by allowing negotiation, and slowed the process down.
This is not obvious to everyone, and does lead to people feeling their life is undervalued. The reason for NICE's approach is to do the maximum good with the resources available - and the way to do that is to put the drug companies under pressure. Unfortunately it does the same for patients too.
Adam Wishart has himself lost a parent to cancer, and so at the start of the article is very much on the side of the patients who are asking why they are being denied new treatments which they think might help them, which have been rejected by the National Council for Clinical Excellence on the grounds that they cannot be justified in terms of value for money. Naturally the patients believe that the lives of their loved ones (usually their loved ones, not themselves) is worth any amount of money.
This is a very emotive, and emotional, issue and some people will think that the NHS should be about saving lives and not about the cost of treatment. Adam Wishart explores this and quite unusually moves beyond his initial position to recognising that finances are limited, and if we spend too much on any one treatment we reduce the amount available for other treatments. He asks the very difficult question, that has to be tackled by the NHS and by NICE, "should we give preference to terminally ill patients by giving them access to expensive new treatments that could extend their life, or should we spend the money on less ill patients who will benefit from their treatment for years to come". The wisdom of Solomon indeed is needed for such questions.
He raises the question of why the drug companies charge so much for their new products, and quite reasonably explains that they are out to make a profit, and the way to do that is to charge a high price. And if people will pay $100 000 for another year of life (and wouldn't we all if we had the money) then it is in their interests to charge that - even if it means some people cannot afford it.
The point I wanted to get to though is his final point - "why can't NICE negotiate lower prices?". The NICE process is to approve drugs for clinical use on the basis of value for money - and it is a pass/fail system. If you cannot demonstrate that the efficacy of your new drug justifies its cost, then it is not approved and will not be provided on the NHS.
There are several drug treatments that are quite beneficial, and quite expensive, and fail the NICE test because of their cost - surely if we negotiated with the manufacturers to lower their prices we could provide them on the NHS?
This seems sensible at first glance, certainly to people not used to the commercial environment. What is not apparent is that this will lead to higher prices overall.
What NICE are doing is asking for, effectively, a fixed price proposal. They want the bidding companies to put in their very best price - the one that will give them the best chance of winning business. Removing the oppportunity to negotiate puts the pressure on the drug companies to put in a low price to improve their chance of winning the contract - in effect they are going to always put in a price on the low side of the range of possible pricing points.
If we introduce post bid negotiation we have a number of consequences.
The first is the that the drug company no longer has so much fear of not being succesful, and so is more likely to put in a price in the middle or top of their possible pricing band - if this price is too high they can always reduce it in negotiation to win the business. The fear of not getting the business is a key factor in salesmen setting lower prices - remove it and they will go for higher margins.
So, the average input prices will go up - and the average price paid will go up as a consequence. We will approve anything below our value for money point, though those prices may be higher than under the no-negotiation system, and will negotiate on those that are too expensive. On average this means prices paid increase - not the first time, and not on everthing, but over time and on average they will rise. Note that the performance of the drug has not improved - but the price we pay will rise, meaning the NHS becomes less cost effective.
Note that we have also created more work for ourselves by allowing negotiation, and slowed the process down.
This is not obvious to everyone, and does lead to people feeling their life is undervalued. The reason for NICE's approach is to do the maximum good with the resources available - and the way to do that is to put the drug companies under pressure. Unfortunately it does the same for patients too.
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